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Introduction 
 
In many cities, there is a concentration of social problems to certain inner-city areas. 
The disproportionate presence of poverty, crime and unemployment in central urban 
areas has been extensively documented by a number of empirical studies (e.g. 
Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport (2000), Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996), 
Fieldhouse (1998), Immergluck (1998), Reingold (1999) and Raphael (1998)). A 
number of explanantions for this spatial pattern of social problems have been 
suggested, many of which view unemployment as a key problem. The explanatory 
factors used are commonly some variation on notions of opportunity, influence and/or 
mobility. The traditional spatial mismatch hypothesis of Kain (1968) argues that 
suburban job growth has increased the distance an average inner city worker must 
commute to work, and thereby increased their costs of employment. In a much cited 
contribution, Wilson (1987) suggests that unemployment is part of a greater tangle of 
social problems, but deems salient the exodus of good role models from poorer 
neighbourhoods as an explanation of these problems. There have also been 
suggestions of an inflow of poor people to inner city areas, due to lower housing costs 
(see e.g. Glaeser, 1999) or access to public transportation for those too poor to own a 
car (Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2000). O’Regan and Quigley (1998) find human 
capital and exposure to the employed the most important factors for employment, 
from which we can surmise that low skill levels in inner cities lead to unemployment, 
which leads to more unemployment as others follow suit. Conversely, Bertrand, 
Luttmer and Mullainathan (1999) find that the probability of being on welfare 
increases with your exposure to social networks in which welfare use is more 
common. 
 
The notion that there are neighbourhood or peer group effects in the spatial pattern of 
unemployment, has lately received much attention. Though empirical studies 
documenting neighbourhood effects face some methodological challenges, there 
nevertheless seems to be a consensus that such effects are real and important (see e.g. 
Glaeser, 1999). If indeed there are neigbourhood effects in employment, one 
implication is that the spatial distribution of employment might exhibit multiple 
equilibria. Or, in the words of Glaeser and Scheinkman (2000), there might exists a 
social multiplier, where small changes in the fundamental causes of individual 
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employment might have a large impact on the aggregate level of employment. That 
small changes in employment policy might have a large impact on aggregate 
employment, is obviously something of which policy makers should take note. 
However, to correctly heed these neighbourhood effects, we need some theoretical 
framework within which to study their implications. 
 
In this paper, I propose a theoretical framework by means of which we can study the 
joint impact of neighbourhood influence and worker mobility on the level and spatial 
distribution of urban unemployment. The purpose of the paper is to provide a 
foundation for a systematic treatment of the issues involved, rather than to draw 
precise policy implications. The notion of influence used is consistent with that of 
Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull (1999), where workers are assumed to be influenced 
by a social norm against being unemployed, and where the strength of the norm 
depends on the number of employed workers. In contrast to Lindbeck et al, however, I 
assign workers locations on a social grid, and assume that each worker is influenced 
only by his closest neighbours. The norms are thus local, rather than global, in scope. 
The existence of a social grid also permits the study of worker mobility, which in the 
model takes the form of pairs of workers exchanging locations, as in the 
neighbourhood segregation model of Schelling (1971). A variety of ways in which 
workers might decide to move is explored, some of which are consistent with the idea 
of Wilson (1987) that good role models leave depressed neighbourhoods, some of 
which are not. 
 
The basic approach of the paper is to model the locations and employment status of 
workers as a stochastic process, where workers are repeatedly drawn at random to 
make either decisions of whether or not to be employed, or of whether or not to move 
to another location. The limit sets of the process are taken to represent the patterns of 
employment and worker locations we can expect to see in the long run, when the 
process has run for a sufficiently large number of periods. The objective of the paper 
is to see how different assumptions about the manner in which workers make 
employment and mobility decisions can lead to different long-run outcomes. Though 
essentially a model of interdependent preferences, many of the elements of the model 
developed below were inspired by models in the field of evolutionary game theory, 
specifically those of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), Ellison (1993) and Young 
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(1993, 1998). In particular, the notion of local interaction is similar to that introduced 
by Ellison. Since the time horizon within which it makes sense to study employment 
and mobility decisions is restricted, however, we focus only on long run outcomes 
and do not introduce error terms into decisions to select between long run outcomes, 
the way the aforementioned models do. The basic model also has similarities to that 
of Bala and Goyal (2001), but has a different object of study. 
 
In the following section I present an initial version of the model in which workers are 
immobile and segregated according to their level of education, and have their 
employment decisions influenced by their neighbours. In section three, this simple 
introductory version is used to illustrate that reducing the sample of neighbours 
observed by a worker when making employment decisions, in effect works as a means 
of selection between long run outcomes. In particular, if sample sizes are below a 
certain level, the state of full employment is the only possible long run outcome. 
Section four specifies the general model in which workers make both employment 
decisions and decisions of where to live, and section five suggests a range of different 
ways in which decisions of whether or not to move can be made. In section six, I 
show that a state of full employment and complete segregation according to education 
is a long run outcome for almost all of the motives for mobility specified. Moreover, 
if workers move to locations that are strictly better on some characteristic, very 
different long run outcomes are possible, including states of full employment, states 
of full unemployment among those with a low level of education, states of full 
segregation according to education and states of full integration. In addition, more 
non-segregated long run outcomes are possible when mobility decisions are based on 
neighbourhood employment rates rather than neighbourhood composition in terms of 
education. 
  
 
A model of neighbourhood effects in a segregated city 
 
Consider a finite population of N workers, who inhabit equally many locations of a 
circular city. The workers are heterogeneous in some characteristic { }HLe ,Î , which 
we take to be education, though it might also be productivity or some other 
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characteristic. Denote by 1N  the number of workers with a high level of education, 
He = . And let 12 NNN -=  be the number of workers with a low level of education, 
Le = . Initially, we will assume that workers are completely segregated in terms of 
education, with the high education workers occupying positions 1 through 1N , and 
the low education workers inhabiting positions 11 +N  through N. In this formulation, 
workers thus do not have a choice of where to live. 
 
Workers do, however, have a choice between working full time (E) and being 
unemployed (U). We will assume time is discrete, and in each period each worker has 
a probability 1,0Îd  of being called upon to revise his current employment status. 
When revising, a worker perceives the rewards from working as the utility (.)u  of 
consuming his net wages (.)w . We assume that wages are increasing in levels of 
education, )()( LwHw > , and for a worker with education ie  we write the payoffs 
)(Eip from being employed as 
 
 ( )[ ]ii ewuE =)(p         (1) 
 
The rewards from being unemployed are the utility of consuming unemployment 
benefits T. There is also a social cost to being unemployed, which depends on the 
composition of the neighbourhood of a worker in terms of employment. We assume 
each worker has k neighbours to each side of him on the circle, 2k neighbours in all. A 
revising worker at location i observes a sample [ ]ks 2,1Î  of his neighbours, and 
assumes the proportion iq  of employed workers in this sample is representative for 
his neighbourhood. The social cost to being unemployed is an increasing function 
)( iqv  of this proportion. The payoffs )(Uip  from choosing unemployment can then 
be written as1 
 
 )()()( ii qvTuU -=p         (2) 
 
                                                 
1 In equation (2) we assume additive separability. This means that we view the utility from benefits and 
the social costs as distinct elements which do not influence each other. 
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The social cost )( iqv  might have several interpretations. Lindbeck, Nyberg and 
Weibull (1999), who employ a similar payoff structure, suggest that the cost )( iqv  
might reflect some social norm in favour of working, a norm whose strength depends 
on the number of agents adhering to it. Alternatively, if we view )( iqv  as a relative 
social cost, capturing the difference in socially derived payoffs when unemployed as 
compared to when employed, )( iqv  might represent some advantage in acting 
similarly to one's neighbours. Being the deviant can expose you to the resentment or 
distrust of others, but there are also more tangible rewards from acting in a manner 
similar to others. Being employed while having a network of employed neighbours 
might for instance provide you with more opportunities for finding a better paying job 
or with better ways of doing your current job. And if you are unemployed in a 
neighbourhood of unemployment, your chances of discovering better ways of 
exploiting the system of benefits might increase. 
 
However social costs are construed, payoffs translate into actions in the following 
way. A revising worker at location i chooses employment if )()( UE ii pp > , and 
unemployment if the opposite inequality holds. If )()( UE ii pp = , the worker is 
indifferent and tosses a coin to select his employment status.  
 
For given forms of the functions (.)u , (.)w  and (.)v  and a given value of the 
parameter T, we can derive the minimum proportion *eq  of employed workers needed 
to induce a worker with education e to choose employment. In other words, there is 
some *Hq  such that a high education worker chooses employment if 
*
Hi qq > , and 
unemployment if *Hi qq < . Similarly, there is some 
*
Lq  such that a low education 
worker chooses employment if *Li qq >  and unemployment if 
*
Li qq < . To add some 
further structure to the model, assume that 0* <Hq , which means that a high education 
worker always chooses employment no matter how much or how little employment 
there is in his neighbourhood. This restriction eases analysis, by decreasing the 
number of states we have to consider. For low education workers, on the other hand, 
1,0* ÎLq , which implies that their choice of employment status does differ according 
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to the employment situation of their neighbourhood.2 Utilities and social costs fitting 
these restrictions are illustrated by the below figure. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Restrictions on payoffs 
 
Given the assumption that agents are immobile and segregated, we can represent the 
state of play in period t by a vector tm , whose ith element { }UEm ti ,Î  is the 
employment status of the agent at position i on the circle at time t. The state space O  
consists of all state vectors m  such that each element in m  is either E or U. 
 
{ } [ ]{ }NiUEmi ,1,,: Î"Î= mO       (3) 
 
For ease of exposition, let us name a few states. Denote by EEm  the state in which 
everyone is employed, i.e. 
 
[ ]{ }NiEmi ,1,: Î"=º mm EE       (4) 
 
Similarly, let EUm  represent the state in which only the high-education agents are 
employed, while the low-education agents are unemployed 
 
                                                 
2 The set of which *Lq  is an element does not contain its boundaries, which means that low education 
workers are not indifferent if everyone in their neighbourhood is employed or unemployed. Including 
the boundaries would not alter the gist of the results that follow, but would make them significantly 
less tidy, as the limit sets in the boundary cases  could be cycles containing a large number of states. 
0 1
iq
(.)ip
( )[ ]Hwu
( )[ ]Lwu
)()( iqvTu -
*
Lq
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[ ] [ ]{ }NNiUmNiEm ii ,1,&,1,: 11 +Î"=Î"=º mm EU    (5) 
 
Given the manner in which agents revise their employment status, the evolution of the 
state vector tm  constitutes a Markov chain on the state space O . For any given 
neighbourhood sample size s, let )(sP  be the transition matrix implied by the process 
of revision, where element jk of )(sP  is the probability of going from state j to state k 
from one period to the next. For any given s, we can then represent the process by a 
transition matrix )(sP  on a state space O , which we can sum up as ))(,( sPO . 
 
 
Long run behaviour in a segregated city 
 
Our object of study is the evolution of play as agents repeatedly reconsider their 
employment status. The long run outcomes of this process, i.e. where we end up after 
the process of revisions has run for a large number of periods, is represented by the 
limit sets of the process. A limit set is a set of states which once reached, the process 
never leaves.3  Even more strictly, an absorbing state is a limit set consisting of only a 
single state. In other words, once we have reached an absorbing state, we remain in 
that state in all later periods. A limit set that contains several states, is often referred to 
as a limit cycle. 
 
For the above process, the following proposition captures the long run behaviour of 
agents: 
 
PROPOSITION 1 
Consider the process ))(,( sPO . For 1N  and 2N  sufficiently large: 
i) EEm  is an absorbing state for all 1,0* ÎLq  and all [ ]ks 2,1Î . 
ii) EUm  is an absorbing state if and only if 1,5.0* ÎLq  and *
Lq
k
s > . 
iii) There are no other limit sets for any 1,0* ÎLq  and [ ]ks 2,1Î . 
                                                 
3 Markov chains and limit sets are defined more rigorously in an appendix. 
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A formal proof of the proposition is presented in an appendix, as are the proofs of 
later propositions. 
 
The first part of the proposition tells us that the state of full employment, EEm , is an 
absorbing state for all relevant values of *Lq  and s. The state of full employment is 
thus robust to variations in these parameters. The intuitive reason EEm  is an 
absorbing state in all these cases, is that a revising worker in this state draws a sample 
of only employed workers, and thus chooses to remain employed. Once we are in the 
state of full employment EEm , no worker ever alters his employment status, which 
means that we stay in EEm . 
 
In contrast, the state of full unemployment in the low education group EUm  is only an 
absorbing state for a restricted range of values of *Lq  and s. Specifically, 1,5.0
* ÎLq  
means that for a low-education worker the required number of unemployed 
neighbours that would make him choose unemployment is lower than the required 
number of employed neighbours that would make him choose employment. 
Moreover, the sample of workers cannot be too small, 1,5.0* ÎLq  and *
Lq
k
s >  imply 
that ks > , so workers must sample more than half their neighbourhood for 
unemployment to be a stable long-term outcome. 
 
The reason EUm  is not an absorbing state when low education workers are more 
easily persuaded to choose employment than unemployment, is as follows. Imagine 
that a low education worker chooses employment if exactly half or more of his 
neighbours are employed, 5.0* =Lq . Assume that there are at least k employed high 
education workers. In any given period there is a chance an unemployed low 
education worker living next to a high education worker is called upon to revise his 
employment status. If he samples his entire neighbourhood, ks 2= , he perceives a 
neighbourhood employment rate of 50% and thus chooses employment. If he samples 
less than his entire neighbourhood, ks 2< , there is still a chance that half or more 
than half his sample are employed, upon which he chooses employment. The same 
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argument applies if in the next period the next unemployed worker on the circle 
revises his employment status, so there is a chance he chooses employment as well. 
And thus we can continue around the circle until all low education workers have 
chosen employment, and we have reached the state of full employment EEm . The 
state of full employment among those with a low level of education thus unravels as 
the workers at the edges of the unemployed segment switch to employment. 
 
A similar argument tells us why neighbourhood samples must be of a certain size for 
EUm  to be an absorbing state. Imagine the smallest possible sample size, 1=s , and 
consider once more the unemployed low education worker living next to a high 
education worker. The sample drawn by this worker might consist of a high education 
employed worker, which would make him choose employment for any relevant value 
of *Lq . The same is true for the next unemployed worker on the circle, and so on until 
we reach the state of full employment EEm . As the second part of proposition 1 tells 
us, the minimum sample size needed to prevent such an unraveling of the unemployed 
segment decreases as it gets harder to make low education workers choose 
employment. 
 
The unemployed segment does not unravel from its edges in the above manner, if a 
low education worker chooses employment only if more than half his neighbours do 
5.0* >Lq , and if sample sizes are sufficiently large *
Lq
k
s > . In that case, EUm  is an 
absorbing state. Note that this hinges on the size of the low education group being 
sufficiently large for the unemployed to sustain each other's choices. As the last part 
of the proposition establishes, EUm  and EEm  are in fact the only possible limit sets 
of the process. The reason is that if there are two low education workers living next to 
each other who differ in their employment status, then they have the same number of 
employed neighbours. If called upon to revise, at least one of them might therefore 
want to alter his status. Repeated revisions of this sort can bring us to EEm  or EUm . 
 
For certain values of the parameters of the model, we thus have two absorbing states, 
whereas for other values we have only one. In particular, a notable implication of 
proposition 1 is that by reducing the sample size of the agents in the model, we can 
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reduce the number of absorbing states. Reductions of sample size can thus be viewed 
as a means of selection between absorbing states in the present model. As small 
sample sizes might be taken to represent imitative behaviour of agents, and larger 
sample sizes more rational best reply deliberations, a reasonable interpretation of this 
result is that less rationality entails a more unique prediction of long run outcomes. 
 
 
A model of neighbourhood effects and mobility 
 
The above assumption of full segregation and immobile agents is rather extreme, yet 
serves as a useful introductory case. We now abandon this assumption, allowing any 
initial configuration of residences for high and low education agents, and affording 
agents the opportunity to switch locations. Workers thus sometimes revise their 
employment status, and sometimes their place of residence. The choice of 
employment status takes place much as in the above model, whereas for the choice of 
residence a range of different rules that might govern mobility are proposed. 
 
As in the preceding model, there are N agents occupying as many locations on a 
circle, 1N  of whom have a high level of education (H) and the remainder a low level 
of education (L). The idea that workers sometimes revise their employment status and 
sometimes their place of residence can be modelled in a variety of ways, yet we 
choose the following simple variant. In each period there is a random draw, which 
with probability p puts us in a situation mode (S) and with probability )1( p-  puts us 
in a residence mode (R). The size of p might then reflect the frequency with which 
choices of employment are made relative to choices of mobility. 
 
In a period in which we are in a situation mode, each worker has a probability 
1,0Îd  of being selected to revise his employment status. The choice between 
employment (E) and unemployment (U) is then made the same way as in the 
preceding model, with one modification. Having made the above point about sample 
sizes, we now abandon this element and let ks 2= . A worker revising his 
employment status now observes the proportion of employment in his entire 
neighbourhood (i.e. across all k2  neighbours), and if we denote by iq  the proportion 
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employed in the neighbourhood of the worker currently occupying location i, the 
payoffs to this worker from unemployment become 
 
)()()( ii qvTuU -=p         (6) 
 
A revising worker compares these payoffs with the payoffs from employment given 
by equation (1), and makes the choice which maximizes his payoffs, tossing a coin if 
indifferent. The restriction on payoffs imposed earlier remain in place, so a high 
education worker always chooses employment, whereas a low education worker is 
influenced by the level of employment in his neighbourhood. In the situation mode, 
no worker changes his place of residence. 
 
In a period where the random draw puts us in a residence mode, two workers are 
drawn at random to consider switching locations with each other. The basic idea is 
that a move is made if both find the residence of the other more desirable than their 
own, or if one of the two finds the residence of the other more desirable and has the 
means to compensate the other for making the switch. In this respect, the model 
resembles the residential segregation model of Schelling (1971). In the present model, 
there is a variety of ways in which workers can assess the desirability of locations. In 
the next section, we discuss a range of these. The different ways of assessing locations 
are captured by rules of mobility, stating that two workers exchange locations if they 
and their neighbourhoods have certain characteristics. If the two do not have the 
required characterstics, the workers remain in their current locations. In the residence 
mode, no worker revises his employment status. 
 
With mobile agents, we can represent the state of play at time t by a matrix tM , 
whose ith column { } { }LHUE ,, ´Îtim  captures the employment status and the level 
of education of the agent at location i on the circle at time t. The state space O  
consists of all state matrices M  such that each column im  of M  has E or U in its first 
row, and H or L in its second row. 
 
{ } { } [ ]{ }NiLHUE ,1,,,: Î"´Î= imMO      (7) 
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For expositional convenience, we name a few sets of states. Denote by EEM  the set of 
states in which all workers are employed. 
 
 { } { } [ ]{ }NiLHE ,1,: Î"´Îº imMMEE      (8) 
 
Moreover, let EESEGM  be the set of states in which every worker is employed, and 
workers are completely segregated according to their level of education. Note that 
EESEGM  is a subset of EEM . If A is a set of locations on the circle, and ?  the set of all 
such sets A that contain 1N  adjacent locations on the circle only, then we can define 
EESEGM  as follows. 
 
{ }?MMEESEG ÎÏ"=Î"=º AAiLEMAiHE i ),(&),(: im   (9) 
 
Similarly, let EUM  denote the set of states in which all workers with a high level of 
education are employed, and all workers with a low level of education are 
unemployed. 
 
{ } [ ]{ }NiLUHE ,1),(),,(: Î"Îº imMMEU      (10) 
 
The set of states in which all high education workers are employed, all low education 
workers unemployed, and workers are completely segregated according to levels of 
education, we call EUSEGM . It follows that EUSEGM  is a subset of EUM . 
 
{ }?MMEUSEG ÎÏ"=Î"=º AAiLUMAiHE i ),(&),(: im   (11) 
 
In contrast, let INTM  be the set of states of perfect integration, where every other 
worker has a high level of education and is employed, and the locations in-between 
are occupied by low education workers who are unemployed. 
 
{ } { }
{ } { } þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
"="=
"="=
º
even odd) ,,&even  ,,(or 
even) ,,&odd ,,(:
NiLUiHE
iLUiHE
ii
ii
mm
mmM
MINT   (12) 
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This set exists only when there are equally many agents with each type of education, 
which implies that the total number of agents must be even. Nevertheless, when these 
states do exist, they are a candidate to consider when calculating limit sets. Note that 
INTM  is a subset of EUM . 
 
 
Rules of mobility 
 
To know the properties of the process that governs the evolution of the state of play 
matrix, we must specify how decisions to move are made. To this end, we define a 
number of rules of mobility, each of which captures a different motive for moving. In 
the context of the above model, a worker revising his place of residence basically has 
two characteristics by which to evaluate how attractive a neighbourhood is to live in. 
One is the level of employment in the neighbourhood (or conversely the level of 
unemployment), the other is the proportion of high education workers in the 
neighbourhood (or conversely the proportion of low education workers). For any state 
OMt Î  and any neighbourhood size k, let tiq  denote the proportion of employed 
workers in the neighbourhood of the worker residing at i, and let tih  denote the 
proportion of high education workers in that neighbourhood. A revising worker can 
use one of these characteristics, or a combination of both, to calculate whether another 
location is better than his own.  
 
Even if a worker desires to move to another location, the worker currently occupying 
that location might be unwilling to switch. In this case, the worker desiring to switch 
might compensate the other party, if he has the means to do so. Whether a switch is 
made thus depends on characteristics of the revising workers. One assumption is that 
employed workers have the means to compensate unemployed workers, and high 
education workers have the means to induce a switch with low education workers. 
The below rules of mobility capture variations of these ideas, depending on the 
neighbourhood characteristics by which workers evaluate the attractiveness of 
locations. 
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Let us start with the case where workers evaluate locations solely by the employment 
rate of their neighbourhoods. Here we make the basic assumption that workers are 
upwardly mobile, and thus desire to move to a location with an employment rate no 
lower than their current location. We also make the assumption that when one worker 
wants to move but not another, an employed worker can compensate an unemployed 
worker in order to induce a switch. For the mobility rules defined below, it would not 
make that much of a difference if we added the possibility that high education 
workers can compensate low education workers. Let us define three mobility rules 
based on upward mobility in terms of employment, starting with the one that requires 
the least in terms of an improvement in employment. 
 
Mobility rule 1r  states that workers want to move to locations that have at least as 
many employed neighbours as their current location, where the employment rate of a 
neighbourhood is gauged by its level before a move is made. In other words, 1r  
supposes a limited amount of rationality in workers, since a location that is as good as 
your current one before a move is made, might actually prove worse after the move is 
made. 
 
DEFINITION 1: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 1r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If  i) ta
t
b qq ³ , ii) { } { }LHE ,´Îtam  and iii) ( )LU ,=tbm . 
 
The definition of rule 1r  thus says that if two workers are drawn to revise their 
locations, they switch if one is employed and the other unemployed, and the latter is 
currently in a location with at least as many employed neighbours as the former. Note 
that this and the following definitions describe only the columns in which 1tM +  differs 
from tM , i.e. the locations that are affected by workers revising their locations, for all 
locations i unaffected by such revisions ti
1t
i mm =
+ , as implicitly specified by the 
general description of the residence mode. 
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The next rule 2r  holds agents to be slightly more rational, comparing the rate of 
employment in their current location to what would be the rate of employment in a 
prospective location after they had moved there. As in the preceding rule, workers 
desire to move to locations with at least as many employed neighbours, and two 
workers switch locations if one is employed and desires to move and the other is 
unemployed. 
 
DEFINITION 2: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 2r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If thereby  i) ta
t
b qq ³
+1 , ii) { } { }LHE ,´Îtam  and iii) ( )LU ,=tbm . 
 
A third rule 3r  states that workers want to move to locations where there are strictly 
more employed neighbours. Whether workers gauge employment by its level before 
or after a move is made, does not matter that much here, but we assume that they use 
the after-move level. As the below definition explains, an employed and an 
unemployed worker switch locations if the employed worker so desires. 
 
DEFINITION 3: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 3r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If thereby  i) ta
t
b qq >
+1 , ii) { } { }LHE ,´Îtam  and iii) ( )LU ,=tbm . 
 
Of course, workers need not be upwardly mobile. Frank (1985) suggests that it can be 
better to be a large fish in a small pond than vice versa. Let us include a rule reflecting 
this idea, where employed workers crave the status of being employed in a 
neighbourhood where few others are. Rule 4r  states that an employed and an 
unemployed worker switch locations if the employed worker gets strictly less 
employed neighbours this way. This rule is then in a sense the opposite of the 
preceding rule 3r . 
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DEFINITION 4: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 4r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If thereby  i) ta
t
b qq <
+1 , ii) { } { }LHE ,´Îtam  and iii) ( )LU ,=tbm . 
 
Having introduced a few rules based solely on neighbourhood levels of employment, 
let us now turn to rules that rely only on proportions of high and low education 
workers. In what follows, we will adopt the basic idea of Schelling (1971) that agents 
gravitate towards neighbourhoods that hold a greater number of agents of their own 
type, where the type of an agent is his level of education. High education workers thus 
prefer to live in neighbourhoods richer in high education workers, and low education 
workers prefer neighbourhoods poorer in high education workers. For the mobility 
rules to come, we will assume that a high education and a low education worker 
switch positions when the former so prefers, in order to keep definitions minimalistic. 
However, we could equivalently have assumed that a switch is made when both find it 
beneficial. Moreover, adding the possibility that low education employed workers 
compensate low education unemployed workers for making a switch the former finds 
desirable, would not significantly affect the results. 
 
The first rule based on neighbourhood composition in terms of education, 5r , states 
that workers desire to move to locations where the number of neighbours currently 
sharing their level of education is at least as high as in their current locations. In the 
rationality awarded agents, this rule thus resembles 1r , since agents assess locations 
by their neighbourhood composition before a move is made. 
 
DEFINITION 5: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 5r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If  i) ta
t
b hh ³ , ii) { } { }HUE ´Î ,tam  and iii) { } { }LUE ´Î ,tbm . 
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The next rule 6r  presupposes a higher degree of rationality, in stating that workers 
prefer to leave their current location if a prospective location holds more neighbours 
sharing their level of education, after the move is made. 
 
DEFINITION 6: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 6r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If thereby  i) ta
t
b hh ³
+1 , ii) { } { }HUE ´Î ,tam  and iii) { } { }LUE ´Î ,tbm . 
 
A third rule based on neighbourhood composition in terms of education, 7r , states 
that workers move only to locations with strictly more of their own type. The 
definition assumes neighbourhood compositions are compared after a move is made, 
but comparisons being made before the move would not affect the results to come. 
 
DEFINITION 7: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 7r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If thereby  i) ta
t
b hh >
+1 , ii) { } { }HUE ´Î ,tam  and iii) { } { }LUE ´Î ,tbm . 
 
Once more, one might entertain the possibility that a worker would rather be a big fish 
in a small pond, than blend in with their neighbours. In the present context, this would 
mean that workers prefer locations poorer in neighbours sharing their level of 
education. Rule 8r  captures a variant of this idea, where locations with strictly fewer 
neighbours of their own type are preferred by workers. 
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DEFINITION 8: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 8r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If thereby  i) ta
t
b hh <
+1 , ii) { } { }HUE ´Î ,tam  and iii) { } { }LUE ´Î ,tbm . 
 
Thw two characteristics of a neighbourhood, the rate of employment and the 
proportion of high education workers, can also be combined in a variety of ways, to 
gauge how attractive locations are. Let us explore a few simple rules that combine the 
two. The first two of these rules are lexicographic orderings according to the two 
characteristics; workers prefer a location better to another according to a first 
characteristic, but if two locations are equally good according to the first 
characteristic, then workers prefer the location that is better according to the second 
characteristic. In this manner, rule 9r  states that an employed and an unemployed 
worker switch locations if the former worker gets a strictly higher number of 
employed neighbours that way; if he gets as many employed neighbours, a switch is 
made if he is a high education worker who gets strictly more high education 
neighbours if he moves. 
 
DEFINITION 9: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 9r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If thereby  i) ta
t
b qq >
+1 , ii) { } { }LHE ,´Îtam  and iii) ( )LU ,=tbm  
or i) ta
t
b qq =
+1  and ta
t
b hh >
+1 , ii) { } { }HUE ´Î ,tam  and iii) { } { }LUE ´Î ,tbm . 
 
Rule 10r  is just the reverse, a high and low education worker switch locations if the 
former gets strictly more neighbours of his own type; if he gets at least as many, a 
switch is made if the low education worker is unemployed and the high education 
worker gets at least as many employed neighbours. 
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DEFINITION 10: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 10r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If thereby  i) ta
t
b hh >
+1 , ii) { } { }HUE ´Î ,tam  and iii) { } { }LUE ´Î ,tbm  
or i) ta
t
b hh =
+1  and ta
t
b qq >
+1 , ii) { } { }LHE ,´Îtam  and iii) ( )LU ,=tbm . 
 
The final rule 11r  does not rank characteristics, but states that a move is made 
whenever an employed workers can get strictly more employed neighbours by 
switching places with an unemployed worker, and whenever a high education worker 
can get strictly more neighbours with a high level of education by switching places 
with a low education worker. 
 
DEFINITION 11: 
Suppose that at time t we are in state OMt Î , and that two agents at locations 
[ ]Nba ,1, Î  are drawn to revise their locations. 
Then by rule 11r  tb
1t
a mm =
+  and ta
1t
b mm =
+  
If thereby i)  ta
t
b qq >
+1 , ii) { } { }LHE ,´Îtam  and iii) ( )LU ,=tbm  
or i) ta
t
b hh >
+1 , ii) { } { }HUE ´Î ,tam  and iii) { } { }LUE ´Î ,tbm . 
 
Denote by T  the set containing all eleven rules of mobility. 
 
{ }{ }11,....,1: Î= jr jT         (13) 
 
Given the way in which agents revise their employment status and place of residence, 
for any of the mobility rules TÎjr , the evolution of the state matrix tM  constitutes 
a Markov chain on the state space O . If we denote by )( jrP  the transition matrix of 
the process when rule jr  is in place, we can sum up the process as ( ))(, jrPO . 
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Long run behaviour when agents are mobile 
 
For each of the mobility rules defined above, the limit sets can be computed. For each 
rule, there can be several limit sets, depending on the value of the parameter *Lq . 
Rules that are stricter in their requirements for mobility, typically have more limit 
sets. Limit sets for a specific few of the above rules are explored below, but let us 
start by examining some regularities across mobility rules. 
 
PROPOSITION 2 
Consider the process ( ))(, jrPO . For 1N  and 2N  sufficiently large: 
i) A  state M  is contained in a limit set for all rules { }8rr j -Î T , if and only if 
EESEGMMÎ . 
ii) No state OMÎ  is contained in a limit set for all rules TÎjr . 
 
The first part of the proposition captures the fact that all states in the set EESEGM , i.e. 
states of full employment and total spatial segregation according to education, are 
absorbing states or contained in a limit cycle for every mobility rule defined above 
except 8r . States of this kind are thus remarkably robust to variations in motives of 
mobility, in fact more so than the states of any other set. However, no set of states is 
contained in a limit set for all the previously defined mobility rules, as the second part 
of the proposition posits. Even for states in EESEGM , there are thus bounds to 
robustness. 
 
The intuitive reasons  why states of full employment and full segregation remain in 
place almost whatever motive workers have for moving, are as follows. If everyone is 
employed, no worker has any unemployed neighbours, and thus no worker chooses to 
be unemployed. The local employment norm is everywhere too strong for 
unemployment to be an attractive option. No unemployed workers also means that 
there is no available location for an employed worker to move to, so no moves are 
made on the basis of neighbourhood employment rates.  
 
 22
With full segregation, the high education workers already occupy the locations with 
the most high education neighbours, and they therefore cannot gain more neighbours 
of their own type by switching locations with low education workers. They could get 
as many neighbours of their own type by moving, but since larger segments of high 
education workers are at least as attractive as smaller ones, there is always a chance 
that we return to a state of full segregation. The states of full employment and full 
segregation thus cannot be forever abandoned if moves are made on the basis of 
employment, or if workers prefer to live with their own kind. If, on the other hand, 
workers prefer to live with the other kind, they will move away from concentrations 
of their own kind and not return, in which case a fully segregated state can be forever 
abandoned. 
 
In more technical terms, the reason states in EESEGM  are robust to all rules of mobility 
but one, can be explained in the following way. First, notice that when all players are 
employed, employment is the optimal choice for any worker drawn to revise his 
employment status. If we are in a state EESEGMMÎ , no worker thus ever changes his 
employment status, which means that in all later periods, we remain within the set of 
states where everyone is employed EEM . Second, for any of the above mobility rules, 
save rule 8r , either no location switches are possible by which we go from a state in 
EESEGM  to a state unsegregated according to education, or if such switches are 
possible there exists some series of switches which brings us back to a segregated 
state. For the four mobility rules based solely on neighbourhood employment rates, 
1r , 2r , 3r  and 4r , this is a fairly trivial matter, since according to these rules one 
agent must be unemployed for a location switch to occur. As there is no 
unemployment in a state EESEGMMÎ , there is thus no possibility of a switch 
happening, and each state in the set is thus an absorbing state. 
 
For the first two rules based on education type, 5r  and 6r , location switches are 
possible in any state EESEGMMÎ . Consider the following figure, where there are 
twelve locations, and six workers of each type forming contiguous segments. 
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 Figure 2. Illustration of a state of segregation. 
 
From the figure, we see that a high education agent at the edge of the high education 
segment has as many high education neighbours as his closest low education 
neighbour. Under rule 5r , this implies that two workers of this kind would exchange 
locations if called upon to consider this option. This particular rule thus allows us to 
leave a state EESEGMMÎ  for one without complete segregation. One can show, 
however, that from any state that is not segregated, one can reach any state 
EESEGMMÎ . Loosely, the reason why this happens is that any stray high education 
worker finds more high education neighbours in a contiguous high education segment 
than elsewhere. This means that the states in the set EESEGM  must be part of a limit set 
under rule 5r . Under rule 6r , adjacent high and low education workers in the above 
figure would not exchange locations, as they would get fewer neighbours of their own 
type after such an exchange. However, a high education worker at one edge of the 
high education segment could exchange locations with a low education worker at the 
other edge of that segment. Thus, location switches can rotate the high education 
segment around the circle, which implies that under rule 6r , the states EESEGMMÎ  
form a limit cycle. 
 
As figure 2 reveals, there are no locations to which a high education worker can move 
and get strictly more high education neighbours. In a state EESEGMMÎ , no moves are 
thus possible under rule 7r , which makes each state in the set an absorbing state. 
L
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Rules 9r , 10r  and 11r  just combine strict requirements of employment and high 
education neighbours in various ways, and thus do not allow any location switches, 
making any state EESEGMMÎ  an absorbing state under any of these rules. In sum, 
then, for rules 1r  through 7r  and 9r  through 11r , any state EESEGMMÎ  is contained 
in a limit set. 
 
The reason why no other state is contained in a limit set for all these ten rules, can be 
explained in two steps. First, we can show that for rule 1r , only states of full 
employment EEMMÎ  are contained in limit sets. Consider the following figure in 
which the Ls and Hs of figure 2 have been replaced by Us and Es, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figur 3. Illustration of a state containing employment and unemployment. 
 
For similar reasons as in the above discussion of rule 5r , through location switches 
under rule 1r , we can reach a state in which there is total segregation according to 
employment status. Note that an employed worker at the top of the circle would now 
want to change locations with the unemployed worker to his left. If this happens, the 
next employed worker to the right on the circle would also want to switch positions 
with the unemployed worker. Thus we can continue until the unemployed worker has 
only employed neighbours, and chooses employment if called upon to revise his 
employment status. Every unemployed worker can be brought into the employed fold 
in this manner, and made to choose employment. Once everyone is employed, noone 
U
U
U
U 
U 
U 
E 
E 
E 
E
E 
E 
 25
wants to switch back to unemployment. For the rule 1r , a state is contained in a limit 
set only if EEMMÎ .  
 
Second, under rule 6r , only states segregated according to education are contained in 
limit sets. Through a slightly more complicated argument than in the above case of 
rule 5r , one can show that under 6r  any state in which there is incomplete 
segregation according to education can be transformed into one of complete 
segregation through a series of location switches. Again the main reason is that high 
education workers prefer to move to locations where the concentration of high 
education neighbours is greater, which it is in contiguous segments. Once a state of 
segregation is reached, 6r  does not permit segregation to be abandoned. In sum, then, 
since under 1r  only states of employment are contained in limit sets, and under 6r  
only states of segregation according to education are contained in limit sets, no state 
EESEGMMÏ  can be contained in a limit set for all rules 1r  through 7r  and 9r  through 
11r . 
 
Finally, no state OMÎ  is contained in a limit set across all mobility rules TÎjr , 
due to the fact that no state EESEGMMÎ  is contained in a limit set under rule 8r . From 
figure 2, it is obvious that any high education agent would want to exchange locations 
with any low education agent under rule 8r , since the former agent would thereby 
reduce his number of high education neighbours. However, any high education agent 
thus separated from a high education segment would not want to rejoin that segment, 
since his number of high education neighbours would then rise. In a sense, high 
education workers want to avoid congregations of their own kind. Thus any state 
EESEGMMÎ  can be left for a state outside that set, but since the final switch that 
would lead us back to a state in that set from any other set cannot be made, the states 
EESEGMMÎ  cannot be part of any limit set. 
 
As noted earlier, though states in EESEGM  are particularly robust to variations in 
mobility rules, specific mobilty rules permit a variety of limit sets, sometimes 
including states that are not in EESEGM . The mobility rules requiring prospective 
neighbourhoods to be weakly better are what drives the restriction of limit sets seen in 
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proposition 2. A greater range of limit sets exists under the rules that require a 
prospective neighbourhood to be strictly better for a worker to want to move there. A 
closer examination of long run outcomes under these rules is therefore warranted. A 
full characterization of limit sets is difficult for the rules in question, yet the following 
propositions adequately capture the variety in possible long run outcomes. 
 
PROPOSITION 3 
Consider the process ( ))(, jrPO .  
For 3=j , and 1N  and 2N  sufficiently large: 
i) Any state EEMMÎ  is an absorbing state. 
ii) Any state EUSEGMMÎ  is an absorbing state if and only if 1,5.0* ÎLq . 
iii) Any state INTMMÎ  is an absorbing state if 1,5.0* ÎLq  and k is even. 
 
This proposition addresses rule 3r , by which employed workers move to locations 
that are strictly better in terms of employed neighbours. As the first part of the 
proposition indicates, any state of full employment, regardless of the spatial location 
of high and low education agents, is an absorbing state. The reasons for this are that 
when everyone is employed, no worker ever chooses unemployment, and since there 
are no unemployed workers to switch locations with, no two workers ever exchange 
locations.  
 
According to the second part of the proposition, any state in which there is total 
segregation according to education and every low education worker is unemployed, is 
an absorbing state provided low education workers are more easily persuaded to 
choose unemployment than employment, 5.0* >Lq . As figure 3 tells us, no employed 
worker in such a state would get more employed neighbours by switching places with 
an unemployed worker. And the proportion of employed neighbours for any low 
education worker in such a state is one half or less, which implies that if 5.0* >Lq , all 
low education workers stay unemployed. If, on the other hand, 5.0* £Lq  the low 
education workers at the edges of the unemployed segment could switch to 
employment, and a succession of such switches would make the unemployed segment 
crumble from its edges. 
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The third part of the proposition claims that a state in which all low education workers 
are unemployed, and there is full integration in the sense that employed high 
education workers and unemployed low education workers occupy alternate locations 
on the circle, is an absorbing state provided 5.0* >Lq  and the number of neighbours to 
each side k is an even number. To appreciate why this is, consider the following 
figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figur 4. Illustration of integrated state 
 
Imagine that 2=k , so each player has four neighbours, two to each side. Exactly half 
the neighbours of every worker are then employed. Thus if 5.0* >Lq , low education 
workers remain unemployed. Every employed worker has two employed neighbours, 
and would get two or less by switching locations with an unemployed worker, so no 
location switches will occur. This line of reasoning extends to any case in which k is 
even. If, on the other hand, k were odd, less than half the neighbours of an employed 
person would be employed, whereas half or more than half his neighbours would be 
employed if he switched locations with an unemployed worker. For k odd, then, a 
state of total integration would crumble. 
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Very similar results to those of proposition 3 can be derived when mobility decisions 
are motivated by neighbourhood levels of education, or by a combination of 
employment rates and levels of education. 
 
PROPOSITION 4 
Consider the process ( ))(, jrPO .  
For { }11,10,9,7Îj , and 1N  and 2N  sufficiently large: 
i) Any state EESEGMMÎ  is an absorbing state. 
ii) Any state EUSEGMMÎ  is an absorbing state if and only if 1,5.0* ÎLq . 
iii) Any state INTMMÎ  is an absorbing state if 1,5.0* ÎLq  and k is even. 
 
The second and third parts of proposition 4 mirror those of the preceding proposition. 
When we allow for the fact that here mobility is (also) based on levels of education, 
the reasons why segregated and integrated states of full unemployment among those 
with a low level of education are absorbing states, are very similar to those recounted 
in the above justification of proposition 3. Let us instead focus on where mobility 
based on education levels produces a different result from mobility based on 
education, as captured by the first part of the two propositions. When mobility 
happens  due to differences in levels of education, or such differences provide an 
added reason to move, all states of full employment need not be contained in limit 
sets. Intuitively, this can be explained by imagining a state of full employment in 
which all high education workers but one form a contiguous segment. The high 
education worker isolated from his peers would then gain high education neighbours 
by switching locations with a low education worker at the edge of the contiguous 
segment of high education workers. Once such a move is made, we reach a state of 
full segregation, in which no high education worker can get more high education 
neighbours through further moves. In other words, while segregated states of full 
employment are absorbing states, not all non-segregated states of full employment are 
absorbing states. 
 
In conjunction, propositions 3 and 4 reveal that if moves are made to locations that are 
strictly better on some characteristic, a wide range of long run outcomes can be 
observed. Both states of full employment and of full unemployment among those with 
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a low level of education can be absorbing states, as can both fully segregated and fully 
integrated states. Moving processes of this kind thus permit a wide variety of worlds 
to exist in the long run. However, variety is greater where decisions to move are based 
solely on employment levels, than where these decisions feature a comparison of 
neighbourhood education levels. In a sense, then, mobility based on education 
generates a bias towards more segregated long run outcomes. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
The results obtained in this paper show that complete segregation and full 
employment is a long run outcome robust to variations in sample size, payoffs to 
workers and mobility motives. Though sample size was studied only in the initial 
model with fixed locations, where reduced samples were heralded as a means of 
selection among limit sets, a similar point could be made if employment decisions in 
the models including mobility were based on limited samples. However, then we 
would also have to tackle the question of whether only employment decisions should 
reflect limited samples, or if samples ought also to be assumed limited in mobility 
decisions. If so, more moves would be permitted under each of the above mobility 
rules, which on the one hand could mean that segregated states would be easier to 
reach, while on the other hand segregated states could also be easier to leave. Though 
limited samples might in this context reduce the number of limit sets, the number of 
states included in each limit set might rise, which makes the selection effect more 
dubious. 
 
As noted initially, the purpose of the above framework is to study the joint impact of 
employment and mobility decisions in an urban context. A few of the assumptions on 
which the analysis is based are of course highly stylized, in particular the idea that 
workers inhabit a circular space, and that their payoffs from employment and 
unemployment are restricted they way they are. A more general model would let 
workers inhabit a more general social grid, and one way of analyzing such a model 
would be by means of the concept of contagion thresholds introduced by Morris 
(2000). Assuming greater variation in the  characteristics that determine the payoffs to 
individuals would make the analysis richer, but also more complex as long run 
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outcomes would vary according to how the population is distributed across these 
characteristics. Finally, as matters of education or productivity are influenced by the 
choices, opportunities and social situation of workers, making these characteristics 
endogenous would also constitute an improvement to the framework proposed here. 
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Appendix: Proof of propositions 1 through 4 
 
The two processes ))(,( sPO  and ( ))(, jrPO  are discrete time Markov processes on 
finite state spaces, since the probability of transiting between two states from the 
current period to the next, depends on the properties of no state other than the current. 
A state m' (or M' ) of such a process is accessible from another state m  (or M ), if 
there is a positive probability of reaching m'  (or M' ) from m  (or M ) in a finite 
number of periods. Two states communicate if each is accessible from the other. A 
limit set is defined as a set of states such that all states in the set communicate, and no 
state outside the set is accessible from any state in the set. A limit set is thus a set of 
states which once reached, the process never leaves. An absorbing state is a limit set 
consisting of a single state, whereas we call a limit set consisting of several states a 
limit cycle. 
 
For the process ))(,( sPO , an absorbing state is a state in which no worker would 
alter his employment status, for any sample he could draw of his neighbours. For the 
process ( ))(, jrPO , an absorbing state is a state in which no worker would alter his 
employment status, and no two workers would switch locations by rule jr . In the 
below proofs of the propositions, we typically establish some absorbing states (or 
limit sets), and then proceed to rule out further limit sets by showing that an absorbing 
state (or a limit set) is accessible from the remaining states. 
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
 
i) In state EEm , for any revising worker, the proportion of employed neighbours 
observed is one, *1 Li qq >= . No worker ever changes his employment status, which 
means that no other state is accessible from EEm . The state EEm  is thus an absorbing 
state. 
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ii) If at time t we are in state EUm , then  
 
t
i
t
N qq ³+11  for all [ ]NNi ,21 +Î       (A1) 
 
The sequence of revisions in which agents at positions 11 +N  through N  successively 
revise their employment status has positive probability. If with positive probability 
*
11 L
t
N qq ³+ , then with positive probability we get Em
t
N =
+
+
1
11
, which implies that with 
positive probability tN
t
N qq 1
1
2 11 +
+
+ =  and Em
t
N =
+
+
2
21
, which by repeated application 
implies that with positive probability Em it iN =
+
+1
 for all [ ]1,1 NNi -Î . With positive 
probability we thus reach EEm  in a finite number of periods, which implies that EEm  
is accessible from EUm , and since EEm  is an absorbing state, EUm  can therefore not 
be contained in any limit set. 
 
If on the other hand the probability that *11 L
t
N qq ³+  is zero, then by virtue  of (A1), 
*
L
t
i qq <  for any revising player at location [ ]NNi ,21 +Î . No sequence of revisions 
thus exists, for which Em iN =+
t
1
 for any t>t  and [ ]1,1 NNi -Î . In this case, no 
other state is accessible from EUm , it is consequently an absorbing state. 
 
 The state EUm  is thus an absorbing state if and only if *11 L
t
N qq <+  for all possible 
samples the player at position 11 +N  could draw. For any sample size [ ]ks 2,1Î , 
5.011 ³+
t
Nq  with positive probability, since it is always possible that the sample the 
player at the edge of the employed segment draws contains all employed neighbours 
or only employed neighbours. For EUm  to be an absorbing state, we must therefore 
have 5.0* >Lq . Moreover, since at most 111 =+
t
Nq  if ks <  and s
k
q tN =+11  at most if 
ks ³ , we must have *Lqs
k
<  for *11 L
t
N qq ³+  to have zero probability. Thus, for 
EUm  
to be an absorbing state, we must have 
*
Lq
k
s > . 
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iii) Imagine that at time t we are at some state { }EUEE' mmm ,Ï . Starting at location 
11 +N  and moving clockwise, find the first two locations for which  1'' +¹ ii mm  where 
[ ]1,11 -+Î NNi . Two adjacent agents have 22 -k  neighbours in common, they 
have each other as neighbours, and their final neighbour they do not have in common. 
For two adjacent agents with different employment status, the employed agent then 
has at least as many unemployed neighbours as the unemployed agent, and the 
unemployed agent has at least as many employed neighbours as the employed agent. 
Thus, if Em i ='  and Um i =+1' , then 
t
i
t
i qq ³+1 , and vice versa. For at least one of the 
two agents there must then exist some sample which would make him alter his 
strategy upon revision. If the player at location i alters his strategy, then by 
implication all players from 1-i  counter-clockwise to 11 +N  might successively 
alter their strategies. If the player at location 1+i  alters his strategy, we proceed 
clockwise to the next pair of adjacent agents with different employment status. By 
repeated applications of this procedure, we eventually end up in a state where all low-
education agents have the same  employment status, i.e. in EEm  or EUm . No state 
{ }EUEE' mmm ,Ï  can thus be contained in a limit set.?  
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
 
i) First we prove that any state EESEGMMÎ  is contained in a limit set under all 
mobility rules { }8rr j -Î T .  Note that in any state EEMMÎ , *1 Li qq >=  for any 
location [ ]Ni ,1Î , so no state outside EEM  is accessible from a state in EEM . In 
words, no worker ever switches to unemployment since all his neighbours are 
employed. Since EEEESEG MM Ì , no state outside EEM  is thus accessible from a state 
in EESEGM . 
 
For the mobility rules based on employment, 1r , 2r , 3r  and 4r , location switches 
occur only between unemployed and employed workers, and since there are no 
unemployed workers in any state EESEGMMÎ , these states must be absorbing states. 
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For rules 5r  and 6r , location switches are possible. However, we can prove that from 
any state in EEM  that is not in EESEGM , i.e. that is not segregated, we can transit to a 
state in EESEGM . Hence, states in EESEGM  must be contained in some limit cycle. 
Consider any state EESEGEE MMM' -Î , and note that it has at least two segments of 
adjacent high education agents, and two segments of low education agents, otherwise 
it would be segregated. By implication, there are at least four pairs of high and low 
education workers residing at adjacent locations. By virtue of an argument similar to 
that used in the proof of proposition 1iii), the low education  worker of such a pair 
must have at least as many high education neighbours as the high education worker of 
that pair. This due to the fact that they have 22 -k  neighbours in common, they have 
each other as neighbours, and only one neighbour that they do not share. 
 
From the pairs of adjacent high and low education workers, take the pair with the 
highest number of high education neighbours (if there are several such pairs, pick any 
one of them). Let us say their proportion of high education neighbours is hˆ . If the 
number of workers with each type of education, 1N  and 2N , are large, there now 
exists some other pair of adjacent high and low education  workers that have hˆ  or less 
high education workers, and that do not have the former pair in their neighbourhood. 
Both under rule  5r  and 6r , the high education worker of the latter pair and the low 
education worker of the former would switch locations.  
 
We thus reach a new state 'M' , where the high education worker that just moved has 
hˆ  high education neighbours, and any low education worker living next to him also 
has hˆ  high education neighbours. Furthermore, for any worker that does not have this 
high education worker as a neighbour, the proportion of high education workers is 
equal to or less than what he had in state M' . Among these, there thus exists some 
pair of high and low education adjacent agents, where the high education worker 
would switch locations with the low education worker adjacent to the high education 
worker that just moved. 
 
Thus we reach a new state ''M' , from which we can repeat the argument a finite 
number of times until a low education segment is eradicated. Then we start all over 
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again by finding the pair of high and low education workers with the highest number 
of high education neighbours, and gradually eradicate the segment associated with 
this low education worker as well. A finite number of repetitions of this procedure 
eradicates all low education segments but one, and we have reached a state in 
EESEGM . 
 
For rules 7r , 9r , 10r  and 11r , in a state EESEGMMÎ  no location switch is ever made 
on the basis of employment, since under rule 7r  it is not permitted, and under rules 
9r , 10r  and 11r  there are no unemployed workers with whom an employed worker 
can switch positions. Any switches would have to be made on the basis of education. 
However, if at time t we are in a state EESEGMMÎ , then 
 
t
j
t
i hh £  if ( )Lm ti ,×=  and ( )Hm tj ,×=      (A2) 
 
By implication, no high education worker can get strictly more neighbours with a high 
level of education by switching locations with a low education worker, and no 
switches are thus ever made. Under rules 7r , 9r , 10r  and 11r , any state EESEGMMÎ  
is thus an absorbing state. 
 
Next we prove that only states EESEGMMÎ  are contained in limit sets for all rules 
{ }8rr j -Î T . This is done in two steps, first by showing that only states in EEM  are 
contained in limit sets under rule 1r , and second by showing that of the states in EEM , 
only those in EESEGM  are contained in limit sets under rule 6r . 
 
Under mobility rule 1r , any state OM'Î  that is not segregated according to 
employment, can be transformed into one that is thus segregated by a series of 
location switches. Start with any employed agent, and number his position on the 
circle 1. Then move clockwise to the first location occupied by an unemployed agent, 
say location a. Then proceed clockwise to the first subsequent location occupied by an 
employed agent, say at location b. The employed agent at location b has at least as 
few employed neighbours as the unemployed worker at location 1-b , and would thus 
want to exchange locations with him. Having moved to location 1-b , the employed 
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worker has at least as few employed neighbours as any unemployed worker 
immediately preceding him on the circle, and would want to move once more. Thus 
we can continue until the employed worker reaches location a. By repeating this 
process for each employed worker, a contiguous segment of employed workers forms 
from location 1 onwards, a segment that eventually holds all employed workers, 
which means that we are in a state of full segregation according to employment. 
 
From a state of full segregation according to employment, we can proceed to eradicate 
unemployment through further location switches. Imagine that the employed segment 
stretches from location 1 to location c. The unemployed worker at location 1+c  has 
at least as many employed neighbours as the employed worker at location c, and the 
two might therefore exchange locations. The unemployed worker now at location c 
has at least as many employed neighbours as the employed worker at location 1-c , 
and the two might exchange locations. Thus we can keep moving the unemployed 
worker into the employed segment. If the number of high education workers is 
sufficiently high, the unemployed worker in question eventually has only employed 
workers in his neighbourhood. If selected to revise his employment status, he would 
then choose employment. In a similar manner we can move every single unemployed 
worker at locations 2+c  through N into the employed segment one at a time, and 
make them choose employment, which means that we eventually reach some state of 
full employment EEMMÎ . 
 
Under rule 1r , from any state tha t is not segregated according to employment we can 
move to one that is segregated, and from any segregated state we can move to one of 
full employment. A state in EEM  is thus accessible from any state outside that set. But 
as argued above, no state outside EEM  is accessible from a state in EEM , which 
implies that no state outside EEM  is contained in a limit set under rule 1r . 
 
For rule 6r , we have already proved that from any state in EEM , we can transit to a 
state in EESEGM . We now add a proof of the fact that no state outside EESEGM  is 
accessible from any state in EESEGM  under rule 6r . Consider the high education 
workers in a state EESEGMMÎ . If not on the boundary of the high education segment, 
a high education worker has at least 1+k  high education neighbours, and switching 
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locations with any low education worker would leave him with at most k high 
education neighbours. If on the boundary of the high education segment, a high 
education worker has exactly k high education workers, and would get as many high 
education neighbours if he exchanged locations with the low education worker at the 
opposite boundary of his segment, otherwise he would get strictly fewer. The only 
location switches permitted by rule 6r  in a state EESEGMMÎ  are thus between high 
and low education workers at opposite boundaries of the high education segment. 
This implies that from any state in EESEGM  we can move only to other states in 
EESEGM , which implies that the states in EESEGM  form a limit cycle. Moreover, since a 
state in EESEGM  is accessible from any state in EEM , no state in EEM  is contained in a 
limit set under rule 6r . 
 
Summing up, only states in EEM  are contained in limit sets under rule 1r , and of the 
states in EEM  only those in EESEGM  are contained in limit sets under rule 6r , which 
implies that no state not in EESEGM  can be contained in a limit set for all rules 
{ }8rr j -Î T . 
 
ii) Here we need only prove that no state in EESEGM  is contained in a limit set for rule 
8r . Note that any high education worker in a state EESEGMM'Î  has k or more high 
education neighbours, where the workers at the boundary of the high education 
segment have exactly k and those not at the boundary more than k. By switching 
locations with any low education worker, they would get k or less high education 
neighbours. Thus any high education worker not at the edge of the high education 
segment would switch locations with any low education worker. Moreover, a high 
education worker on the boundary would want to exchange locations with the low 
education neighbour next to him on the circle, since he would then get 1-k  high 
education neighbours. (The only location switch between high and low education 
workers that is not permitted under rule 8r  is between a low and high education 
worker at opposite edges of the high education segment.) Thus from a state 
EESEGMM'Î , we can transit to a state EESEGM'M' Ï . 
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However, any switch that caused such a transition cannot be undone, since the high 
education worker who moved now has at most k high education neighbours if he 
moved from the interior of the high education segment or at most 1-k  high 
education neighbours if he moved from the boundary. To make the high education 
segment complete again, he would have to move to a location where he would get at 
least 1+k  high education neighbours in the former case, and k high education 
neighbours in the latter. Under rule 8r , such a move would not be made. And since 
location switches happen sequentially, one at a time, such a move is needed as the 
final switch in a series through which an unsegregated state is supplanted by a 
segregated state. Under rule 8r , then, from a state in EESEGM  we can transit to a state 
in EESEGEE MM - , but no state in EESEGM  is accessible from a state in EESEGEE MM - , 
which means that no state is contained in a limit set for all rules TÎjr .?  
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
 
i) In any state EEMMÎ , *1 Li qq >=  for a worker at any location [ ]Ni ,1Î . Moreover, 
no worker is unemployed, so no two workers ever exchange locations by rule 3r . Any 
state EEMMÎ  is therefore an absorbing state. 
 
ii) If at time t we are in any state EUSEGt MM Î , and we let 11 +N  be the location of 
the unemployed worker who has an employed worker before him and an unemployed 
worker after him on the circle, then (A1) holds. By implication, since 5.011 =+
t
Nq , 
then no worker would ever alter his employment status if 1,5.0* ÎLq . If on the other 
hand, ]5.0,0* ÎLq , then upon revision the player at position 11 +N  could choose 
employment, ( )LE,=+ +1t 1N1m , which implies 5.0
1
21
=+ +
t
Nq , which could mean 
( )LE,=+ +2t 2N1m , and so on until ( )LE,=
+
+
it
iN1
m  for all [ ]1,1 NNi -Î . We have thus 
reached some state EEEESEGit MMM ÌÎ+ , and no state EUSEGt MM Î  is therefore 
contained in a limit set. 
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In any state EUSEGMMÎ , any employed worker has at least k employed neighbours. 
By switching locations with an unemployed worker, the most employed neighbours 
he could get is k. No two workers would therefore exchange locations under rule 3r . 
In conlusion, any state EUSEGMMÎ  is absorbing if and only if 1,5.0* ÎLq . 
 
iii) In any state INTMMÎ , if k is even then 5.0=iq  for all locations [ ]Ni ,1Î . By 
implication, no revising worker changes his employment status if 1,5.0* ÎLq . Any 
employed worker in a state INTMMÎ  has k employed neighbours, and would get k or 
less by switching locations with an unemployed worker, so under rule 3r  no location 
switches occur in such a state. Any state INTMMÎ  is therefore an absorbing state for 
k even and 1,5.0* ÎLq .?  
 
 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: 
 
i) See the proof of proposition 2. 
 
ii) From the proof of proposition 3 we know that in any state EUSEGMMÎ , no worker 
changes his employment status if 1,5.0* ÎLq , whereas all unemployed workers could 
change sequentially to employment if ]5.0,0* ÎLq . Any high education worker has at 
least  k high education neighbours in a state EUSEGMMÎ , and would get k or less by 
switching locations with a low education worker. From the proof of proposition 3ii) 
we know that no employed worker can get more employed neighbours by switching 
locations with an unemployed worker. Under rules 7r , 9r , 10r  and 11r , no location 
switches thus occur in a state EUSEGMMÎ . In conclusion, any state EUSEGMMÎ  is 
absorbing if and only if 1,5.0* ÎLq . 
 
iii) The proof of proposition 3iii) tells us that in a state INTMMÎ , no worker changes 
his employment status if k is even and 1,5.0* ÎLq , and no employed worker could 
get more employed neighbours by switching locations with an unemployed worker. If  
 40
k is even, in any state INTMMÎ  a high education worker has k high education 
neighbours, and would get k or less if by switching with a low education worker. 
Under rules 7r , 9r , 10r  and 11r , then, any state INTMMÎ  is absorbing if k is even 
and 1,5.0* ÎLq .?  
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